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ABSTRACT
CAN LESS MEAN MORE IN INTERNATIONAL AID:
Public Opinion of International Assistance in Ghana
by
Michael Bena 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006 
This study examines public opinion of international aid in Ghana with a focus on 
a multivariate ordinary least squares regression model. It first examines the country of 
Ghana and the events that led to involvement with the International Monetary Fund under 
the Economic Recovery Program. After analyzing existing literature on satisfaction with 
government and economic programs, the study goes on to suggest what might drive 
citizen satisfaction with these programs. Using information from the Afrobarometer 
survey, this thesis proposes that public opinion of international aid programs is related to 
the tangible benefits they provide and the publics’ perceptions of inequality with regards 
to the program. This research then used a multivariate regression analysis to evaluate the 
suggested hypotheses. Finally it will suggest several courses of action that may be taken 
by international aid organizations to improve public satisfaction with their programs.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983 Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to introduce 
structural adjustment under the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 
Entitled the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), these policies were designed to "pursue 
an export-led economic growth strategy and restructure the public sector of the economy 
in order to improve growth prospects.” The country remains highly dependent on 
international aid over 20 years after the initiation of these programs and the quality of life 
for average Ghanaians continues to deteriorate.3 Yet, Ghana remains an example used by 
the IMF and the World Bank of the success of their programs in Africa.4 In Ghana, as in 
many other aid receiving countries, the IMF and World Bank are viewed negatively for 
their role in restructuring the economy. Why are Ghanaians dissatisfied with aid 
programs while the international organizations responsible, and their major donors, see 
success? This paper will suggest that citizens evaluate the programs much differently 
than the organizations responsible for them. Where the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) look to a variety of macroeconomic statistics, citizens view the tangible 
benefits provided by the programs and their perceptions of equality as the important 
factors in judging these programs.
The organizations implementing structural adjustment programs (SAPs) measure 
their success based on macroeconomic factors such as changes in GDP, a balanced
1 Gavin Hilson, “Structural Adjustment in Ghana: Assessing the Impacts o f  Mining-Sector Reform,” Africa 
Today (Winter 2004): 53.
2 Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, “Structural Adjustment Programmes and the international tourism trade in 
Ghana, 1983-99: some socio-spatial implications,” Tourism Geographies (May 2001): 192.
3 Ibid.
4 Neil Ridler, “Fixed Exchange Rates and Structural Adjustment Programmes: Cote D ’Ivoire,” The Journal 
o f Modern African Studies (1993): 303.
1
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budget and a properly valued currency.5 Citizens measure their satisfaction with these 
programs differently, however, looking to two indicators of the effect of the economy on 
their daily lives. The first criterion that citizens base their opinions of government 
programs on is the tangible benefits they receive. If the government is unable to provide 
basic social services to their citizens, economic programs such as SAP will not be 
generally accepted. With the reduced government funding for social programs that 
accompanies SAP, however, governments face a quandary in maintaining many services. 
The second major factor in public opinion of government programs is equality. This 
research suggests if citizens feel that others are benefiting from a program while they 
continue to struggle, they are unlikely to support the program.
The macroeconomic environment in Ghana can be interpreted differently 
depending on which statistics are looked at, but most microeconomic indicators show a 
more pessimistic view of Ghana’s economy. The IFIs generally rely on macro-level 
indicators, but looking to citizens’ evaluations is also important. When high levels of 
citizen dissatisfaction exist in fragile democracies, such as Ghana’s nascent democratic 
state, government stability can be threatened, as happened in Argentina or Bolivia. For 
many governments of the developing world, especially in democratic states, legitimacy is 
a problem after many years of instability and economic uncertainty. If these governments 
are standing beside the IMF and World Bank in implementing unpopular programs that 
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Some theorists argue that democracy must arise naturally once a country has 
reached certain levels of economic and social development.6 Whether Ghana and other 
developing states have actually reached the point where democracy would have evolved 
without outside pressures is debatable, but now that democracy exists, it is in the interest 
of the international community to see that it continues. The collapse of other 
democratically elected governments such as Sudan or Haiti show that weak regimes in 
economically weak states are at risk for violence and a return to authoritarian forms of 
government. Public support “for incumbent government... are driven by reactions to the 
performance of national economies and judgments concerning governments’ 
effectiveness in managing them.”7 In developing countries like Ghana with a history of 
instability a loss of legitimacy could lead to a crumbling democracy or the election of 
fundamentalist leaders that will turn to authoritarian forms of government.
Political instability in Venezuela led to an economic recession in 2002 and 2003, 
with a decrease in GDP of 8.9 percent in 2002.8 Argentina’s economic collapse in 2001 
can be attributed to the deterioration of the political and economic situation, as instability 
took hold in the country. In developing countries stability is often a great challenge. 
Ghana’s democracy has shown signs of recent stability and it is hoped that this can 
continue. By increasing citizen satisfaction with the program that controls so much of 
their country’s economy, the chances of maintaining stability are greatly improved.
Assessing public opinion can reveal important information about IMF 
involvement in developing nations. Recent research has suggested that public
6 Notably Robert Kaplan “Was Democracy Just a Moment?” Atlantic Monthly (December 1997): 55-80.
7 Harold Clarke, Nitish Dutt, and Allan Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and 
Society in Western European Democracies,” The Journal o f  Politics (November 1993): 1000.
8 “Venezuela Profile,” International Debates (November 2004): 227.
3
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perceptions of IMF interventions in emergency situations “constitute a powerful force, 
which can determine the success or failure of a given economic restructuring program.”9 
A lack of understanding on the part of government officials, or even average citizens, can 
negatively affect the performance of these programs. That is, “without the proper 
understanding and support of the people who experience its painful consequences on a 
daily basis, any one or more of the many parts of the program may not be implemented 
effectively.”10 Understanding why citizens are dissatisfied with the programs may help 
governments ensure that these programs are applied in the maimer they were designed to 
be.
To understand citizen satisfaction with aid programs this paper is organized into 
six sections. Section Two gives a brief overview of Ghana’s political and economic 
history. Section Three will examine some of the theory related to public opinion of 
government performance. Through multivariate analysis, in the form of an Ordinary 
Least Squares Regression, Section Four will analyze public opinion in Ghana related to 
the performance of ERP. This analysis will help to show how Ghanaians evaluate ERP 
and what the government can do to improve citizen satisfaction with the program. By 
finding and addressing the sources of public discontent, the Ghanaian government will 
improve its legitimacy and increase support for democracy in general. Section Five will 
explore the results of this analysis and look to potential solutions for Ghana and structural 
adjustment programs in general. Finally, I will conclude by summarizing my findings.
9 Bemd Hayo and Don Chull Shin, “Popular Reaction to the Intervention by the IMF in the Korean 
Economic Crisis,” Policy Reform (2002): 89.
10 Ibid., 90
4
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THE CASE OF GHANA
A coastal state in West Africa, Ghana was traditionally among the more 
prosperous states in the region. Abundant gold reserves provided the state with an 
important place in trans-Saharan trade routes as early as the thirteenth century, earning it 
the title of the Gold Coast and drawing interest from European states looking for a direct 
trade route with Africa.11 The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish a
Figure 1. Map of Ghana
ISO mi 
ISO k m Burkina Faso
........
Mole Bolgatanga * \ /
-r . □ 0 tiTamale -JR/Ver
y
Benin







Volta , ,\  Lake








A sam ankese Tem a




Map copyright www.worldatlas.com. Last accessed July 10, 2006.
11 Library o f  Congress Country Studies: Ghana, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ghtoc.html. Last 
accessed July 12, 2006.
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• 19presence in Ghana with a fortified trading post at Elmina in 1482. The Portuguese 
retained this position for nearly a century before the arrival of the Dutch, who were 
followed by the English, Danish and Swedish in later years. The rising interest in 
establishing a coastal African base for the emerging slave trade in the seventeenth 
century led to a great deal of competition in the Gold Coast. After several centuries of 
struggle within the state, England became the major European power in the Gold Coast 
by the late nineteenth century. In 1874 England established the Gold Coast Colony, 
eventually uniting the tribes and regions that make up Ghana today under one 
administrative unit.13 British rule helped to stabilize the Gold Coast economy, while the 
introduction of the cacao tree provided a huge boost to Ghana’s international trade. By 
1920 Ghana produced more than half the global yield of cocoa.14
Ghana received independence from Britain in March, 1957, becoming the first 
free state in sub-Saharan Africa.15 Until this point Ghana had been a relatively wealthy 
state, especially when compared to its neighbors in West Africa. The stabilization of the 
economy during the colonial period provided the country with a well-developed 
infrastructure for trade and a relatively advanced education system.16 On the strength of 
cocoa exports President Nkrumah received foreign loans to diversify and expand from a 
primarily agricultural country into a mixed agricultural-industrial economy. The crash of 
international cocoa prices in the mid-1960s destroyed the stability of the Ghanaian 
economy, creating the first debt problems for Ghana. Ghana’s economic collapse and 




15 CIA: The World Factbook: Ghana. (2006) Accessed through EBSCOhost.
16 Library o f Congress Country Studies: Ghana.
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world market prices for primary commodities, economic mismanagement, political 
instability and an overvalued currency."17 In February 1966 the military overthrew the 
Nkrumah administration, a sign of the political instability to come; out of the ten political 
leaders that Ghana has had since independence, only 4 came to power through 
elections.18
Frequent regime changes failed to ignite the economy and Ghana continued to 
struggle with international debt, culminating in the adoption of the Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) in 1983. This program was adopted by the Provisional National Defense 
Council (PNDC), a military government led by Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings that came to 
power in 1981. The PNDC suspended the constitution and banned multiparty politics 
upon coming to power. By the late 1980s, the need for more loans from the IMF helped 
to pressure the government’s return to democracy. The first two elections, in 1992 and 
1996, resulted in the continued control of the PNDC and Rawlings. In 2000, however, 
John Kufuor defeated former vice-president Atta Mills in a free and fair election that 
produced the first change in power under the democratic constitution. Kufuor was re­
elected in 2004, an election that was praised for remaining free of controversy in a year 
when other major elections did not.19 For the time being, at least, Ghana 
seems to have a working democracy.
17 Konadu- Agyemang, “Structural Adjustment Programmes and the international tourism trade in Ghana 
1983-99,” 192.
18 Ibid., 192.
19 Notable elections in 2004 that were highly controversial included the US and Ukraine. Cameron Duodu, 
“Ghana Does Itself Proud,” New African (January 2005): 27.
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Ghana’s Economy and the ERP
Today Ghana is seen by many “Western donors as being one of the few relative 
success stories in Africa concerning both economic and political liberalization.”20 ERP
Table 1.
RECENT ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN GHANA21
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP (US$bn) — $5.3 $6.2 $7.6 $8.9 $10.7
Real GDP Growth (% Change) — 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.8 5.8
Total Debt (US$bn) $5.5 $6.9 $7.2 $6.5 $6.1 —
in Ghana helped prevent a complete economic collapse, resulting in consistent GDP 
growth averaging 6 percent over the past decade, reduced inflation, a budgetary surplus, 
and increased export earnings.22 Inflation was reduced from 123 percent at the beginning 
of ERP in 1983 to 29 percent by 1997.23 Additionally, ERP has led to a strengthened 
labor movement in Ghana, which generally supports the neo-liberal reforms taking 
place.24 As noted above, the introduction of ERP also coincided with the beginnings of 
Ghana’s democratic transition as the PNDC was pressured into holding elections in the 
early 1990s to receive additional assistance from the IMF. The statistics above are 
examples of the macroeconomic and political factors that the IFIs, through their major 
donors, use to measure the success of their programs.
20 Piet Kernings, “Organised labour and neo-liberal economic and political reforms in west and central 
Africa,” Journal o f  Contemporary African Studies (September 2003): 448.
21 Data collected from World Bank World Development Indicators and “Economic Indicators,” GhanaWeb, 
available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/economy/statistics.php. Last accessed July 6, 
2006.
22 Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst o f Times: Structural Adjustment 
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These statistics do not tell the whole story, however, as Ghana’s economy also
• • 25shows some key weaknesses. Unemployment was estimated at 20.3 percent m 2002. 
While Ghana’s exports have more than doubled from 1990-2003, it is still only the 9th 
largest exporter in Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, total external debt for Ghana 
doubled over the same period, although their debt burden to the IMF in particular was cut 
by almost 40 percent.27 As a percentage of GDP external debt increased from 31.6 
percent in 1980 to 95 percent by 1995.28 As Table 1 shows, Ghana’s total debt reached a 
peak of $7.2 billion in 2002, exceeding GDP. GDP growth has been promising, and the 
growth of Ghana’s debt has been slowed, but the country still faced a massive debt 
burden in 2004. At the macroeconomic level, Ghana has enjoyed many recent successes, 
but these indicators suggest that not everything has been improving. Additionally, at the 
microeconomic level “living conditions have grown harsh for the rural poor as access to 
education, health and other social services has been severely curtailed under structural 
adjustment.”29
25 “Economic Indicators,” Ghana Web.
26 World Bank World Development Indicators, Section 4: The Economy. Available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/toc.htm Accessed November 8, 2005.
27 World Development Indicators, Section 4.
28 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 474.
29 Ibid., 481.
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■  Very Unsatisfied 
i  ■  Unsatisfied
: □  Neutral 
□  Satisfied
■  Very Satisfied
To evaluate citizen satisfaction with ERP, this research utilizes the 
Afrobarometer survey, which looked specifically at this issue. In the Afrobarometer 
Ghanaians were asked “Have you heard about the Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP)?” Those that had were then asked “How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the 
ERP?” Ghanaians in general are not satisfied with ERP, with only 34% expressing some 
measure of satisfaction, as shown in Figure 2. Many Ghanaians, both within the 
government and in the private sector, think that some of the prescriptions in the program
30were either introduced too soon or in the wrong dosage.
30 Cadman Atta Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economic Development Institute of 
The World Bank, Policy Seminar Report (October 1989): 15.
10
Satisfaction with ERP
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LEGITMACY AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
The instability related to widespread protests can be a problem in democracies 
without a long history of economic success. When high levels of regime support exist 
prior to economic performance crises, government legitimacy is less likely to be 
affected.31 A lack of legitimacy is more likely to lead to the breakdown of democratic 
political systems than performance dissatisfaction. When high levels of legitimacy have 
not been established prior to economic difficulties, however, performance dissatisfaction 
can lead to regime instability.32 Often times in developing states legitimacy is “heavily
to
influenced by, or almost a function of, the performance of the regime.” If the regime 
fails to meet the peoples’ expectations over time, a loss of legitimacy is likely. In 
developing countries under SAPs the performance of the regime is often closely linked to 
the performance of the programs that control the economy.
Emotions play an important role in an individual’s opinion of government 
performance. Conover and Feldman studied the effect of cognitive reactions compared to 
affective reactions on unemployment, satisfaction with personal financial situation, and 
provision of government benefits.34 Conover and Feldman found that cognitive reactions 
to one’s personal economic situation have a smaller effect on satisfaction with 
government performance than emotional reactions to these same variables. Emotions
31 Steven Finkel, Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and 
Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica,” British 
Journal o f  Political Science (July 1989): 350.
32 Ibid.
33 Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis,” in Critical 
Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, Ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999): 31.
34 Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, “Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I’m Mad as Hell 
and I’m Not Going to Take It Anymore,” American Journal o f  Political Science (February 1986): 71.
11
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play an important role in building support for government policy. When citizens are 
dissatisfied with government performance over a long period of time, it is likely to affect 
their emotions towards the government.
A variety of researchers have concluded that the political and economic history of 
a state matters when it comes to how much of an affect the performance of the economy 
has on evaluations of government performance. Clarke, Dutt and Komberg discuss two 
competing theories regarding public attitudes towards democratic political systems. The 
cultural values and norms that are developed in older, economically successful 
democracies build a base of support that strengthens confidence in the democratic 
system.35 In a democratic state experiencing protracted prosperity, an increase in public 
demands on the government is likely to occur as the belief that “government can and 
should deliver high levels of economic performance remain widespread and durable.”36 
The second theory they discuss is political economy.
Political economy theory suggests “public support for incumbent 
governments.. .is driven by reactions to the performance of national economies and 
judgments concerning governments’ effectiveness in managing them.”37 Short term 
economic discontent can lead to political and social change while a sharp decline in 
economic well-being may erode people’s faith in the current system and create demands 
for radical political change. When economic development has not occurred in these 
states, it is more likely that citizens will elect fundamentalist candidates, regardless of the 
likelihood that their election will result in a turn to non-democratic forms of
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government.38 In newly democratic countries citizens will sacrifice democratic choice if 
it is more likely that non-democratic rule will result in an improved economy.
The U.S. and the IFIs have encouraged democracy as a precursor for trade and 
financial assistance. What this fails to consider is that fragile, nascent democracies are at 
the greatest risk of returning to a non-democratic state in the face of economic 
difficulties. Kaplan argues that democracy cannot be forced upon a society with weak 
economic and social foundations, but instead will emerge naturally “as a capstone to 
other social and economic achievements.”39 Newer democracies, like Ghana, may not 
have existed long enough to instill the necessary confidence in their citizens to whether 
economic crises after years of instability and authoritarian rule. The legitimacy of a 
democratic regime can also be threatened by compromises and coalitions which an 
authoritarian government free from opposition need not deal with. This is not to say that 
dictatorships and other non-democratic forms of government are necessarily any better or 
worse than democracy but that one may be better suited to a particular country at a 
particular time.40
The fact that these developing states are often forced to cede economic decision 
making power to the IMF in order to receive assistance does not help. When a 
government stands beside the IMF and World Bank in implementing an unpopular 
program that the people feel is impeding their economic potential, that government’s 
legitimacy may be further reduced. “When people perceive economic conditions to be 
externally controllable, they react with anger directed at who they perceive to be
38 Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment,” 58.
39 Ibid., 60.
40 Kaplan, “Was Democracy Just a Moment,” 59.
13
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responsible.”41 This suggests that when people perceive an externally implemented 
program such as ERP to be performing poorly and not improving the economy, they will 
react negatively to it and in turn, the government implementing it.
As noted above, Ghanaians are dissatisfied with the performance of the ERP. The 
dissatisfaction in Ghana is not an isolated case: backlash to IMF and World Bank reforms 
have led to protest in a variety of countries, including Argentina, Venezuela and 
Bolivia.42 Argentina was dealt a severe economic blow when the weaknesses of its 
economic restructuring became apparent and popular dissatisfaction with the IFIs 
continues. Venezuela and Bolivia, on the other hand, have been moving away from some 
policies introduced under structural adjustment on the strength of popular opinion.
Recent instability in each of these states has given way to high levels of support for the 
governments and increased economic growth.
Argentina at times has been both the shining example given by proponents of the 
neoliberal policies supported by the IFIs and, later, the case used most frequently by 
opponents of these policies. The early years of structural adjustment in Argentina 
showed promise for continuing the economic growth of this middle class country. The 
combination of pressure from the loans with widespread corruption resulted in a fragile 
economy that crashed back to earth in 2001.43 With the freezing of personal bank 
accounts Argentines rioted, protesting the government’s actions. Today many of the 
unemployed have joined together to form groups ofpiqueteros who protest the country’s
41 Conover and Feldman, “Emotional Reactions to the Economy,” 72.
42 Zoe Chafe, “World Bank Involvement in Economic Reform: ‘A Warning Flag’?” World Watch 
(November/December 2005): 9.
43 Ziya Onis, “Argentina, The IMF, and the Limits o f Neo-Liberal Globalization: A Comparative 
Perspective,” The Review o f  International Affairs (Spring 2004): 375.
14
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continued struggles with unemployment by blocking roads to disrupt business.44 The 
economy has shown signs of a slow recovery, but Argentina is still plagued by debt and 
is at risk for long term dependency on the IMF.45
Venezuela represents another South American state that has been dealing with 
instability in recent years. Under President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has been shifting 
away from the policies of the IMF that dramatically increased extreme poverty and 
demands for radical social change in the state.46 Despite claims by the US and the IFIs 
that the government has made undemocratic decisions and mishandled the economy, 
Chavez enjoys widespread support.47 After weathering an opposition-led coup (endorsed 
by the US) Chavez has maintained his popularity and satisfaction with democracy in 
Venezuela is second only to Uruguay in South America. The coup contributed to a brief 
economic decline 2002 and 2003, but the economy quickly rebounded and Chavez has
AO
been focusing on improving social programs in education, health care and job training. 
The changes in Venezuela accompanying economic growth have given the people hope 
for a stable future after years of instability and economic uncertainty.
Like Venezuela, Bolivia has dealt with instability in recent years as President Evo 
Morales responds to public support in changing policies introduced by the IFIs. The fight 
against water privatization in Cochabamba sparked country wide civic unrest leading to 
several deaths and over 50 arrests.49 The government was finally forced to curtail a water 
privatization contract under fears that government stability may be in jeopardy. More
44 “Pickets Unfenced,” Economist (December 12, 2003): 48.
45 Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, “Breaking the IMF Habit,” Foreign Policy (Nov/Dec, 2004): 84.
46 Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, “A Benign Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006): 201.
47 Ibid., 200.
48 Ibid.
49 Jim Shultz, “Bolivians Win Anti-Privatization Battle,” NACLA Report on the Americas (May/June 2000): 
46.
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recently Morales has nationalized the state’s national gas industry in response to a 2004 
referendum in which nationalization won overwhelmingly.50 In response to strong public 
opinion the government is reversing the privatization trend pushed by the IMF. The 
goals of this privatization program include increasing government revenues and building 
the internal market in Bolivia by providing low interest loans to local industry. These 
policy changes have drawn the ire of the U.S. administration, with President Bush 
discussing the erosion of democracy in Bolivia despite the fact that these measures are 
based on widespread popular opinion.51
These examples show the struggles that developing countries have when dealing 
with unpopular programs. While the citizens may be more satisfied, the international 
community may not be as forgiving. The relationship between Chavez and President 
Bush is severely strained due to differences of opinion. The Bush administration views 
the changes in Latin America as a threat, going so far as an attempt to list Venezuela as a 
state sponsor of terrorism.52 Developments such as this will make it difficult for 
Venezuela to turn back to the IMF in the case of an economic crisis. SAPs have changed 
the manner in which loans are given and the acceptance of democracy and other policies 
of the IFIs is crucial to maintaining their support.
Structural Adjustment Programs
The conditionality attached to loans has long been a characteristic of international 
lending, but comprehensive structural adjustment programs did not become popular until 
the early 1980s. In the wake of an international debt crisis, the IFIs turned to structural
50 Christian Parenti, “Morales Moves,” Nation (June 19, 2006): 21.
51 Ibid.
52 Herrera, “A Benign Revolution,” 201.
16
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• • 53adjustment as the primary tool for rebuilding struggling economies. In the late 1970s 
increasing oil prices, falling prices for many developing country exports, and rising 
interest rates made repayment of existing loans difficult for developing countries 
throughout Latin America and Africa.54 A variety of internal policy mistakes and 
external economic developments helped to deepen the crisis in Africa as countries began 
to rely on external aid instead of improving the performance of domestic economies.55 
By 1980 the IFIs began to look to SAPs with the aim of “restoring incentives for 
production while addressing the public sector spending issue.” 56 The goal of these 
programs was to reduce the influence of the government on the economy, turning to the 
free markets for economic growth.
In the early 1980s structural adjustment began to take hold in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Loans began to feature phased disbursements, allowing the IFIs to ensure that a country 
meets its commitments prior to receiving additional aid.57 The devaluation of currencies, 
liberalization of investment regulations, and trade deregulation have all been prescribed
CO
by the IFIs to help open developing countries to the world economy. By opening their 
economies and devaluing currencies, exports would increase. The World Bank led the
53 Oscar Ugarteche, “The Structural Adjustment Stranglehold: Debt and underdevelopment in the 
Americas,” NACLA Report on the Americas (July/August 1999): 21.
54 Ibid., 22.
55 Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 6.
56 Ibid.
57 “IMF Conditionality,” International Monetary Fund Factsheets, September, 2005, available at 
http ://www. imf. org/extemal/np/exr/facts/conditio .htm.
58 Specific policies include: price reforms to eliminate or reduce subsidies; reducing central government 
budget deficits; restructuring and rationalizing state owned enterprises, generally through privatization; 
liberalizing external trade by removing barriers to free trade and deregulating private industry; improving 
exchange rate policies; and providing incentives to the public sector. Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub- 
Saharan Africa,” 5; Bruce Rich, “World Bank/IMF: 50 Years is Enough,” in Fifty Years is Enough, Ed. 
Kevin Danaher (Boston: South End Press, 1994): 3; and “Frequently Asked Questions About the 
IMF/World Bank,” 50 Years is Enough Network Factsheets, (March 2004): 3. Available at 
http://www.50years.Org/factsheets/FAQ-FactSheet_3.9.04.pdf. (Accessed February 15, 2006.)
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push for developing countries to commit to an export orientation to cure poor economic 
performance.59
Critics of SAPs claim that this can marginalize developing economies, placing 
them in delicate situations. According to some critics the SAPs have placed these 
countries in an economic system in which developing nations have no hope of bettering 
their situation.60 Instead of working towards self-sufficiency, developing economies 
have been encouraged to rely on export production for growth, which often puts them in 
niche positions in the global economy, limiting potential growth.61 Several nations, 
including the Asian Tigers, have experienced rapid growth under the guidance of the 
IFIs, but this growth has generally slowed and these nations are still far from gaining 
international economic power. The Asian Financial Crisis was a great shock to these 
successful economies and required emergency aid from the IMF to aid in recovery.
The sovereignty of developing governments has been compromised as they are forced to 
comply with the conditions set by the IFIs, or risk losing huge amounts of international 
aid.63
This loss of sovereignty can take many forms, but generally occurs when aid is 
withheld until further structural adjustments occur, often in the form of privatization 
plans. In Ghana, for instance, the British withheld $300 million in aid until the 
government agreed to privatize water, with control to end up in the hands of
59 Dali Yang, “China Adjusts to the World Economy: The Political Economy o f China’s Coastal 
Development Strategy,” Pacific Affairs 64 (Spring 1991): 42.
60 Rich, “World Bank/IMF,” 6.
61 Ibid.
62 Martin Sengupta, “Is China the Next Superpower?” Defense and Security Analysis (December 2003): 
393.
63 S.K. Agyemang-Duah, “Hypocrisy or Deception?” New African (January 2003): 16.
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multinational corporations.64 This plan was widely protested in Ghana and privatization 
never occurred, while similar plans have been halted in Bolivia and other developing 
nations after widespread popular dissent.65 Water privatization is among the most 
fiercely contested areas of policy that structural adjustment is attempting to change.
In addition to international economic factors, SAPs have also been widely 
criticized for the effects they have on citizens in everyday life. The cuts in public 
spending that have accompanied structural adjustment have reduced the levels of health 
care and education, especially in rural areas of developing countries.66 The reduction in 
social services has also contributed to gender inequalities in these countries as females 
have been disproportionately affected by budget cuts.67 In Ghana healthcare and 
education have been severely cut under ERP, dropping from 7-10 percent of government 
expenditure and 4.3 percent in 1982, respectively to 1.3 percent and less than 1 percent. 
With these reductions urban residents enjoy much better access to social services than 
rural residents, continuing the inequality between regions.69
Proponents of structural adjustment point to the many macroeconomic successes 
that developing countries have enjoyed since their implementation. In Ghana, the ERP 
has helped arrest the economy from a complete collapse. ERP has
64 Ibid.
65 Shultz, “Bolivians Win Anti-Privatization Battle,” 46; and Simon Robinson, “Keeping Water Out of 
Private Hands,” Time (April 5, 2004): 60.
66 Folasode Iyun, “The Impact o f Structural Adjustment on Maternal and Child Health in Nigeria,” in 
Women Pay the Price: Structural Adjustment in Africa and the Caribbean ed. Gloria Emeagwali (Trenton, 
NJ: Africa World Press, 1995): 35.
67 Emily Archer, “The Wells are Drying Up: Water & Women in Ghana,” Off Our Backs (March/April 
2005): 23.
68 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst o f Times,” 476.
69 Ibid, 477.
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resulted in consistent growth of GDP averaging 6 percent over the past 
decade, reduced inflation levels from 123 percent in 1983 to 29 percent by 
1997, created a budget surplus, and increased export earnings.70
SAPs in Sub-Saharan Africa have also been praised for the restructuring and
rationalization of state owned enterprises, reduction or abolishment of food subsidies,
71liberalizing of external trade and providing added incentives for the export sector. The 
magnitude of early GDP growth was related to the commitment to reform, especially 
currency devaluation.72 Proponents claim that in those countries that have “undertook 
reforms and achieved some increase in growth, the majority of the poor are probably 
better off and almost certainly no worse off.”73
If citizens are better off than they were before ERP, it must be questioned why 
they are dissatisfied with the program. To help understand this question this research 
will now briefly discuss the instrument used for the data below, the Afrobarometer 
Survey, which will be followed by a discussion of the variables to be studied.
70 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times” 469.
71 Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 21.
72 Christine Jones and Miguel Kiguel, “Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead,” 
World Bank Policy Research Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 6.
73 Ibid., 7.
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OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMEN 
The Afrobarometer in Ghana
The Afrobarometer Survey “is an independent, nonpartisan research project that 
measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa.”74 It has been 
conducted in 18 countries throughout Africa in order to gather data about trends and 
opinions on the continent. This study will focus on the first round of interviews 
conducted in Ghana in 2000. Ghana first implemented structural adjustment programs in 
1983 under the title Economic Recovery Program (ERP), becoming the first country in 
sub-Saharan Africa to undergo structural adjustment.75 The Afrobarometer Survey asked 
several questions dealing with the Economic Recovery Program and the people’s opinion 
of it.
In this first round of the Afrobarometer in Ghana, 2004 respondents completed 
the questionnaire. These surveys were answered during face-to-face interviews. The 
Afrobarometer is currently entering its third round of surveys. The goal is to measure the 
social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa and, eventually, to analyze trends in 
public attitudes. For the following analysis only 700-750 respondents were considered 
on each variable, as only those who acknowledged that they had heard of ERP gave 
opinions on their satisfaction with it. For those that had heard of ERP, they were often 
able to cite its purposes accurately, but this represents only about 41 % of the population. 
Of those that had heard of ERP, 17% did not know its purpose.
74 “Afrobarometer,” accessed at http://www.afrobarometer.org.
15 Hilson, “Structural Adjustment in Ghana,” 53.
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Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with ERP
As this suggests, despite claims of success by the IFIs implementing these 
programs, many citizens in countries receiving aid are dissatisfied as evident in Figure 1. 
That these programs are unpopular in recipient countries suggests that they are not 
accomplishing their goal of economic development. For this study the dependent 
variable is public satisfaction with aid programs in Ghana. Understanding why citizens 
are dissatisfied with ERP will help in remedying the situation and maintaining 
government legitimacy.
The governments in developing countries are in a difficult position as they deal 
with the unpopularity of these programs. The research above shows that it is crucial for 
new democracies to maintain their legitimacy to avoid a return to authoritarian 
governments. It has also shown that in new democracies, which may have only a tenuous 
grip on their legitimacy to begin with, the performance of the economy has a significant 
effect on the government’s legitimacy. For developing countries giving up power over 
economic decisions to outside interests can be a dangerous proposition. At the same 
time, these countries cannot abandon the programs already in place, as this would likely 
result in economic chaos.
This research will argue that as the tangible benefits provided by the government 
decrease and inequality of opportunity increases, dissatisfaction with SAP and, in turn, 
the government, will result. Tangible benefits are often measured in the social services 
that the government provides the people, ensuring their security and, ideally, their health. 
Equality refers to the tendency of programs to help only select groups in the population, 
even if this is just the perception of citizens. These statistics are not measured by the
22
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IFIs, who judge the success of the programs on macroeconomic statistics and their advice 
is geared towards macroeconomic performance. Because citizens and IFIs measure 
success differently, it creates a problem for the governments of developing countries with 
securing their legitimacy.
How do the citizens of Ghana view the IMF and the World Bank? While the 
Afrobarometer did not ask specifically about these organizations, it did ask about the 
program they are responsible for in Ghana, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP).
This study will utilize Ghanaian public opinion of the ERP to judge their satisfaction with 
the IFIs. In the Afrobarometer Ghanaians were asked “Have you heard about the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP)? ” Those that had were then asked “How satisfied 
or unsatisfied are you with the ERP? ” Responses were measured on a scale with 
possible responses of 1, very unsatisfied; 2, unsatisfied; 3, neutral; 4, satisfied; and 5, 
very satisfied. As Figure 1 shows, only 34% of Ghanaian claimed that they were 
Satisfied or Very Satisfied with the ERP.
It is the thesis of this study that the driving factors behind satisfaction with SAPs 
are the social policy outputs and perceived equality of the program. If the people 
perceive that certain groups are receiving favorable treatment, or that they are not seeing 
any benefits from the programs, they are unlikely to express satisfaction with the 
programs. By ensuring a more equitable program that conveys tangible benefits to 
average citizens, the governments implementing them will be much more likely to 
receive popular support. In addition to the social policy outcomes and inequality issues, 
the analysis will also look at several demographic characteristics to determine if any 
trends exist across Ghanaian society of support for the ERP.
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Independent Variables: Government Performance Opinion Indicators
Because the performance of the government and its economic programs are 
crucial for maintaining legitimacy, this section will focus on several indicators of 
government performance and how they relate to satisfaction with ERP. The thesis of this 
research is that the tangible benefits provided by the government and the inequality of the 
governments programs are the important indicators of satisfaction with ERP. Tangible 
benefits will be measured by three separate variables: access to water, job creation, and 
satisfaction with ones’ economic situation compared to five years before. Inequality is 
measured by just one variable, but it deals directly with whether Ghanaians believe the 
ERP to be discriminatory.
Inequality is a concern for governments that have adopted structural adjustment 
programs as they seek to maintain legitimacy. After long periods of regional inequality
Ifrural areas are home to 64 percent of Ghana’s population and 80 percent of the poor. 
Inequality can have “a major impact on the grievances articulated by communal 
groups. ” 7 7  In Ghana the southern regions have typically received much higher levels of 
investment while those in the north are sometimes forced to relocate in order to find 
jobs . 7 8  The IFIs claim that structural adjustment programs will reduce inequality by
79providing development opportunities to both the rich and poor. In Ghana, however,
o0
critics have argued that inequality is in fact increasing under ERP.
76 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 475.
77 Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict 
Since 1945,” International Political Science Review (April 1993): 188.
78 Konadu- Agyemang, “Structural Adjustment Programmes and the international tourism trade in Ghana 
1983-99,” 197
79 Jones and Kiguel, “Adjustment in Africa,” 6.
80 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 476.
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As economic and democratic development occur, the people are conditioned to 
expect greater equality of opportunity. 8 1 The macroeconomic successes in Ghana suggest 
that this expectation should exist in Ghana today. If the government cannot overcome 
this inequality, it is likely that ERP will not be accepted by those who feel disadvantaged. 
The ERP was designed with this in mind, hoping to create a more equal society. Whether 
this has been achieved, however, is debatable, and the Afrobarometer asked respondents 
specifically if they agreed with statement A or B from the following: “A. The Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP) has helped most people; only a minority have suffered. B. The 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) has hurt most people and only benefited a minority.” 
They were then asked whether they agreed strongly or only somewhat. These answers 
were then coded as 1, agree strongly with A; 2, agree somewhat with A; 3, agree 
somewhat with B; 4, agree strongly with B. Thus as one progresses through the 
responses from 1 to 4, opinion of ERP shifts from mostly non-discriminatoiy to mostly 
discriminatory.
Turning to the tangible benefits variables, access to water will be considered first. 
Regular water access is a necessity of life, yet many Ghanaians struggle to access 
sufficient supplies of water on a daily basis. The scarcity of necessary resources can pose 
a major risk to the stability of society and can lead to the intensification of material 
inequality within states. 8 2  Citizens that do not have proper access to safe water are being 
denied an important component of a healthy life. It has been estimated that 70 percent of
81 Clarke, Dutt and Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western 
European Democracies,” 1000.
82 Ted Robert Gurr, “On the Political Consequences o f  Scarcity and Economic Decline,” International 
Studies Quarterly (March 1985): 53-55.
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disease in Ghana is water related. 8 3 It is generally the poor that deal most frequently with 
resource scarcity, and this is definitely the case for access to water in Ghana. In Ghana 
most of the urban population, 93 percent in 2002, has had reasonable access to an
ox
improved water source, but the story changes for rural residents. In 1990 only 36 
percent of rural residents had access to an improved water source with this percentage
or
almost doubling to 6 8  percent by 2002. This still leaves nearly one-third of the rural 
population without access to a reliable water source.
Social spending and publicly owned services, like sanitary water, are often the 
first areas affected by structural adjustment. As one of the more contentious issues of 
SAP policy, how a government handles the distribution of water has become a very 
important issue in the developing world. Water privatization is a possible solution, but
Ghanaians and citizens throughout the developing world have soundly rejected this
£>/■
alternative, especially since most would be unable to afford private water sources.
Under the pressures of the ERP, water access is not always a priority, although it is an 
important tangible benefit that many people are judging the government’s performance 
by. When poor water distribution remains in public hands, as it does in Ghana, the 
government is responsible when people are unable to get clean water. Many rural 
Ghanaians are unable to regularly access an improved water source, reflecting on the 
government’s inability to provide tangible benefits for the people. The Afrobarometer 
asked “over the past year, how often, i f  ever, have you gone without: Water for domestic
83 Archer, “The Wells are Drying Up,” 23.
84 An improved water source is defined as “a household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected 
well or spring, or rainwater collection.” Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters 
per person per day from a source within one kilometer o f the dwelling. From World Bank Development 
Indicators, Section 3: The Environment.
85 Ibid.
86 Robinson, “Keeping Water Out o f Private Hands,” 60.
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use?” Responses were measured on a scale from 1-4 with 1 meaning never; 2, 
occasionally; 3, frequently; and 4, all the time.
Another social policy output is measured in citizens’ opinions of how the 
government has performed in creating jobs. Many jobs have been lost in Ghana as a 
result of the retrenchment policies in state owned enterprises under the ERP. Clarke, 
Dutt and Komberg found that while growing unemployment suppressed calls for radical 
change while heightening demands for social reform . 8 7  Joblessness often will “diminish 
people’s feelings of self-esteem and personal efficacy,” which will lead them to lowered
no
confidence in the ability to effect changes in the government. However, in Ghana and 
other developing countries where SAP resulted in many jobs lost to retrenchment of 
public sector jobs, the government may be found to be more to blame for unemployment.
In Africa, wage-workers have been the most adversely affected by structural 
adjustment, facing wage restraints, rising consumer prices, suspension of benefits and 
increased job insecurity. 8 9  In Ghana regional inequalities intensify the situation, 
especially for those in the typically neglected northern regions, where many of the 
country’s unemployed reside. Continued underemployment in Ghana has the potential to 
increase dissatisfaction with ERP. Ghanaian public opinion of job creation within the 
country was measured by the question of “how well would you say the government is 
handling the following problems: Creating jobs?” Responses were measured on a 4- 
point scale with the following meanings: 1, very badly; 2, quite badly; 3, fairly well; and 
4, very well.
87 Clarke, Dutt and Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western 
European Democracies,” 1015.
88 Ibid, 1000.
89 Konings, “Organised labour and neo-liberal economic and political reforms in west and central Africa,” 
488.
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The final measure of tangible benefits provided by the government is satisfaction 
with one’s personal situation compared to five years before. Positive feelings of life 
satisfaction have been shown to influence satisfaction with democracy and reduce 
demands for social change and reform . 9 0  If ERP is having the intended consequences of 
improving Ghana’s economy, it is likely that over time Ghanaians will be more satisfied 
with their personal situations. The Afrobarometer asked residents “when you look at 
your life today, how satisfied do you feel compared with five years ago? ” Responses 
were measured on a 5-point scale where 1 was much less satisfied; 2, slightly less 
satisfied; 3, about the same; 4, slightly more satisfied; and 5, much more satisfied. By 
comparing their situation to five years earlier, residents will show indirectly whether they 
believe the ERP is helping.
Control Variables
In addition to the provision of tangible benefits and perceptions of inequality, the 
public’s satisfaction with ERP may be influenced by long term factors as well. This 
research will consider four demographic characteristics as control variables. Age, 
gender, education and income were each considered and included in the multivariate 
regression analysis. 9 1
90 Clarke, Dutt and Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western 
European Democracies,” 1015.
91 Age was coded into 5 categories: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60+. Gender was coded as 1, male, and 
0, female. Education was coded into 5 categories: 1, no formal education; 2, primary school, 1-8 years; 3, 
high school, 9-12 years; 4, college, 13-16 years; and 5, post-graduate work, 17 or more years. Finally, 
income was coded into 8 categories: 0, none; 1; less than 50,000; 2, 50,001-100,000; 3, 100,001-300,000;
4, 301,000-500,000; 5, 501,000-700,000; 6, 701,000-1,000,000; 7, 1-5 million; and 8, over 5 million. All 
totals are in cedis, the local currency for Ghana.
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Hi: As belief that government policy was discriminatory increased, satisfaction with 
ERP will decrease.
H2 : As satisfaction with economic condition today versus five years previous 
increases, satisfaction with ERP will increase as well.
H3 : As individuals go without water for domestic use more frequently, their 
satisfaction with ERP will decrease.
H4 : As an individual’s opinion of government job creation improves, satisfaction with 
ERP will increase as well.
Hypotheses
This section will examine the variables above and discuss hypotheses as to how 
they relate to citizens’ satisfaction with ERP. This will allow for examination of how 
each affects satisfaction with ERP and will provide a closer look at what governments 
can focus on to improve the implementation of these programs in the eyes of average 
citizens. After examining each individual variable’s influence on satisfaction with ERP 
through bivariate analysis, a multivariate model will be considered that examines their 
collective effect.
Hi: As belief that government policy was discriminatory increased, satisfaction 
with ERP will decrease.
As the macroeconomic successes of Ghana gain praise from the international 
community, it is expected that those who feel like they have not benefited from equality 
of opportunity will be unhappy with the current system . 9 2  The ERP was designed to help 
Ghana overcome a long history of regional inequality. If over time Ghana’s level of 
inequality is not changing, or is actually increasing as some critics have claimed, it is
« •  Q -3unlikely that citizens will be satisfied with the program.
92 Clarke, Dutt and Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western 
European Democracies,” 1000.
93 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 476.
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H2: As satisfaction with economic condition today versus five years previous 
increases, satisfaction with ERP will increase.
Those who are more satisfied with their personal situation compared to the past 
are likely to have benefited from the improvements in Ghana’s economy. When citizens 
are satisfied with their lives, they are more likely to be supportive of the government and 
its programs. 9 4  Alternatively, those who have seen their personal situation get worse over 
time will be less supportive of the government’s economic programs.
H3 : As individuals go without water for domestic use more frequently, their 
satisfaction with ERP will decrease.
Water is a necessity for daily life, yet many Ghanaians are sometimes unable to 
access sufficient amounts of clean, safe water. Competition for scarce resources can lead 
to instability, and when government legitimacy is already low this effect will be 
magnified. 9 5  As long as the provision of water remains a public responsibility, the 
government will be at least partially to blame when citizens lack regular access.
H4 : As an individual’s opinion of government job creation improves, satisfaction 
with ERP will increase.
High levels of unemployment can have a demoralizing on society and especially 
the individuals it affects. 9 6  Unemployment in Ghana has been a consistent problem, but 
the retrenchment of public sector jobs under ERP has not helped the situation. This job 
loss is directly related to ERP, while the continued high levels of unemployment suggest 
that economic development has not translated to significant levels of new jobs in Ghana.
94 Clarke, Dutt and Komberg, “The Poltical Economy o f Attitudes toward Polity and Society in Western 
European Democracies,” 1000.
95 Gurr, “On the Political Consequences o f Scarcity and Economic Decline,” 55.
96 Conover and Feldman, “Emotional Reactions to the Economy,” 72.
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An underemployed citizenry is unlikely to be satisfied with a program such as ERP if it is 
not creating new jobs. Before proceeding to the multivariate regression analysis, a series 
of bivariate line graphs will be created to determine what relationships exist between 










a .  2.5 
o'UJ
Figure 3
Effect o f Opinion on ERP Discrimination on ERP Satisfaction
2 j . ------   1
     .
1.5---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I -    1
Agree Strongly Helped Agree Somew hat Helped Agree Somew hat Hurt Agree Strongly Hurt Most 
Most Most Most
Pearson's Correlation -.286 
(Significant at the .001 level)
Has ERP Helped Most or Hurt Most?
Hi: As belief that government policy was discriminatory increased, 
satisfaction with ERP will decrease.
As Figure 3 shows, those who believed that ERP helped most ranked satisfaction 
with ERP much higher than those who believed the program was discriminatory. There 
was a sharp difference between the two groups. Those who felt strongly that the 
government policy was helping citizens most average 3.21 satisfaction with ERP, slightly
to the positive side, while those feeling strongly that ERP hurt most averaged a 
satisfaction ranking of 2.4. Thus, the belief that ERP was discriminatory corresponded to 
a difference of about . 8  on a five-point scale.
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Figure 4
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H2 : As satisfaction with economic condition today versus five years previous 
increases, satisfaction with ERP will increase as well.
As expected Figure 4 shows that those who are more satisfied with their financial 
situation are also more satisfied with ERP. There is a clear trend towards more 
satisfaction with ERP for those who are more satisfied with their comparative position. 
Respondents that were much less satisfied with their condition averaged 2.36 on the 
satisfaction with ERP scale while those that were much more satisfied averaged 3.23 
satisfaction with ERP. The difference between those most satisfied with their situation 
and those least satisfied was about .87 on the five-point scale of ERP satisfaction.
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Figure 5
H fect o f Going Without Water on ERP Satisfaction
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H3 : As individuals go without water for domestic use more frequently, their 
satisfaction with ERP will decrease.
As Figure 5 shows, this trend was continuous over the full range of the variable. 
Those who had never gone without water averaged 2.72 in their opinion of ERP, nearly 
neutral, while those who had frequently gone without water averaged 2 .2 1 , closer to a 
somewhat unsatisfied rating for ERP. This corresponds to a difference o f  about .5 on a 
five-point scale.
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Figure 6
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H4 : As an individual’s opinion of government job creation improves, satisfaction 
with ERP will increase.
As Figure 6  shows, there is a trend that those who feel better about the 
government’s current performance on job creation also feel better about ERP. Those who 
felt the government was handling job creation very well averaged 3.58 satisfaction with 
ERP, while those who felt the government was performing badly rated satisfaction with 
ERP 2.35. This is a difference of slightly over 1.2 on a five-point scale, the most 
substantial effect of any independent variable in the bivariate analysis.
This study will now move on to a multivariate analysis in the form of an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression. OLS regression models are used to measure the 
cumulative effect of the independent variables on satisfaction with ERP. After running
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an initial model, variables that have no significant effect on satisfaction with ERP will be 
removed to form a trimmed model. The trimmed model allows for interpretation of how 
citizens judge structural adjustment programs based on the effect of the remaining 
variables. This will help to determine what developing country governments need to do 
in order to ensure that these programs are accepted and supported by the citizens.
Table 2.
OLS Regression Results











Government Policy Helps -.213*** -.2 1 2 ***
Most or A Few (.040) (.040)
Satisfaction vs. 5 Years 124*** .125***
Ago (.034) (.033)
Without Water Last Year -.151* -.141*
(.059) (.059)
Job Creation .316*** .325***
(.050) (.049)
Adjusted R Square .171 .173
N 711 723
An F test indicated that these models were significant at the .001 level. 
Coefficients are unstandardized, with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Multivariate Analysis
Table 2 shows the results from two multivariate regression analysis models used 
to test the hypotheses. The first model predicted 17.1% of the variance in the satisfaction 
with ERP according to the adjusted R Square. This is a strong model considering it is 
based on survey data. In this first model 711 cases were considered; the original sample 
contained 2004 respondents, but these models only consider those Ghanaians that had 
heard of ERP. In the original model the control variables income, education, gender and 
age were included, but none were significant factors in predicting satisfaction with ERP 
and thus were removed from the second model. Demographic characteristics in Ghana 
do not seem to influence opinions of ERP. Each of the other factors maintained a 
significant relationship in the multivariate model, just as they had in individual models. 
After the regression analysis, it becomes clear that income, gender, age and education do 
not explain satisfaction with ERP.
In evaluating the trimmed model we find that it predicts 17.3% of the variance in 
satisfaction with ERP according to the adjusted R Square. The trimmed model 
considered only those variables directly related to social policy outputs and inequality in 
Ghana, linking the responses directly to the ERP. Again, this is a strong model and the 
exclusion of those variables that do not influence opinion of ERP increases its accuracy. 
The trimmed model considered 723 cases. The increase in cases from the initial is due to 
the removal of variables that had missing data.
The first variable considered in the trimmed model was whether the respondent 
believed the government’s policy was discriminatory, or if it helped the majority of 
citizens. For every one-unit increase in opinion on government policy discrimination,
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satisfaction with ERP decreased by .212, holding all other variables constant. This 
relationship was significant at the .001 level. To put this relationship in perspective, this 
represents a change of .636 over the full range of the variable. Those that viewed ERP as 
most discriminatory judged the program to be .636 less satisfactory than those who 
thought it was not at all discriminatory. This supports His which suggests those who feel 
more strongly that the government policy only helps a few view ERP less favorably.
The model also measured citizens’ satisfaction with their economic situation 
compared to 5 years before. The regression analysis found that for every one-unit 
increase in satisfaction with his or her situation, a respondent viewed ERP .125 more 
favorably, holding all other variables constant. To put this in perspective, this represents 
a change of .5 over the full range of the variable. That is, those who are the most 
satisfied with their economic situation were .5 more satisfied with ERP than those who 
were least happy about their economic situation. This supports H2 , which predicted that 
this relationship would exist.
The analysis now turns to the effect of access to water on satisfaction with ERP. 
For each one-unit increase in how often a respondent had been without water, satisfaction 
with ERP declined by .141, holding all other variables constant. This relationship is 
significant at the .05 level. To put this in perspective, there were 4 possible responses, 
which correspond to an overall decrease in satisfaction with ERP of .423. Citizens who 
went “without water for domestic use all the time” judged ERP to be .423 less 
satisfactory than those who had regular water access. This supports H3 , which claimed 
that those who went without water more frequently would be less supportive of ERP.
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The final factor in the model considered the effect of how the respondent believed 
the government was doing creating jobs on satisfaction with ERP. For every one-unit 
increase in opinion of the government’s handling of job creation, satisfaction with ERP 
increased by .325, holding all other variables constant. This relationship was significant 
at the .001 level. This represents a change of .975 over the full range of the variable, 
showing that those who strongly believe that the government is doing well creating jobs 
view ERP nearly a full point higher than those that believe strongly that the government 
is doing poorly creating jobs. This supports showing that perceptions of the 
government’s ability to create jobs are related to satisfaction with ERP.
This multivariate analysis shows four key variables that effect opinions of ERP, 
three social policy outputs and one measure of the equality of the program. The strongest 
variable was opinion of the government’s ability to create jobs. The other measures of 
tangible benefits had smaller effects, both less than half of the effect of job creation. The 
people’s perception of equality was the second most powerful predictor of satisfaction 
with ERP. This suggests that governments should focus on equality and job creation 
when adhering to structural adjustment programs. Unfortunately, many times these 
programs result in job cuts as inefficient state-owned enterprises are privatized. In Ghana 
the implementation of ERP resulted in the retrenchment of over 300,000 jobs in the 
public sector. 9 7  Finding new jobs for these workers in addition to combating existing 
unemployment remains a challenge for Ghana as they struggle to develop. 
Methodological Considerations
Several potential limitations of this research must be mentioned. First and 
foremost, the fact that much of the previous research focuses on evaluations of
97 Konadu-Agyemang, “The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 474.
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government performance and not the economy may skew the data. Adapting theories 
dealing with opinions of the government to an economic program designed by an outside 
organization may lead to faulty assumptions about the effects that these variables have on 
satisfaction with ERP. The influence of economic performance on opinions of 
government performance is generally found to be strong, though, and it is very likely that 
much of this theory is applicable. The Afrobarometer provides an important resource for 
evaluating trends in Africa, but caution must be used in applying the results to other 
countries as the survey is biased towards liberalizing regimes. 9 8  Finally, while job 
creation had a relatively strong effect on satisfaction with ERP, the other variables had 
less substantial effects that cannot be overstated.
98 From the Afrobarometer website, located at www.afrobaromter.org. Last accessed 7/18/06.
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DISCUSSION
Paul Wolfowitz has recently taken the helm at the World Bank with the stated 
goals of improving the Bank’s expertise with regards to education, health, infrastructure, 
energy and agriculture." He has also pledged to continue the Bank’s recent commitment 
to eradicating poverty. 1 0 0  These are positive signs that suggest the IFIs are already 
beginning to learn the lessons presented by this research. If economic programs can 
allow the government to continue to provide tangible benefits to the people, replace the 
jobs lost through retrenchment of the public sector, and work to reduce inequality, the 
programs are much more likely to be accepted. 1 0 1 The important question, then, is what 
can be done to ensure that economic programs can reform the economy, encourage 
development, and maintain even moderate levels of support. This section will examine 
some strategies that could be employed by the IFIs including debt relief, microlending, 
and ensuring that these programs provide benefits for all citizens of a country.
Debt Relief
As the debt burden continues to grow for many developing countries, debt relief 
and debt cancellation remain hot topics for opponents of the IFIs. As of 2001, the 41 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), of which Ghana is one, owe about $170
• • 107billion to foreign creditors and half of their citizens remain below the poverty line.
Most o f these countries have little hope o f ever paying back the loans based on current
99 Jessica Einhom, “Reforming the World Bank,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2006): 17-22.
100 Ibid.
101 Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 10.
102 M.A. Thomas, “Getting Debt Relief Right,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2001): 36.
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interest rates and current GNPs.103 With debt relief billions of dollars can be put back 
into social services and industrial development that would otherwise go towards paying 
back interest on existing loans.104
The biggest issue opponents have with debt relief is fungibility. Writing off 
developing country debt does not ensure economic development at a similar level to what 
may be achieved by well designed, properly implemented aid programs. Additionally, 
debt relief does not go directly to the poor that it is intended to help, but instead it goes to 
the governments that originally racked up the debt.105 Research has suggested that debt 
relief can work in relatively developed countries with high levels of debt, but that 
controlled aid programs are more promising in poor countries that lack the necessary 
institutions for further development.106
In an attempt to ensure that debt relief produces the intended consequences 
conditionality has begun to be associated with debt relief, but in ways that are less 
controversial than the conditionality of structural adjustment. In 1989, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Nicholas Brady introduced a plan that would relieve debt “contingent on debtor 
countries enacting major economic reforms.”107 The Brady Plan was quite successful, as 
stock markets in recipient countries increase by $42 billion by the time that these nations 
reached their agreed upon goals.108 More recently the Blair Plan for debt reduction in 
2001 excluded several countries because “they did not pass the anticorruption and
103 Ibid.
104 David Ruffin and Nicole Marie Richardson, “With Debt Lifted, Africa Can Rebuild,” Black Enterprise 
(October 2005): 31.
105 Thomas, “Getting Debt Relief Right,” 36.
106 Serkan Arslanalp and Peter Blair Henry, “Research: G8 Debt Relief Plan May Not Help,” (June 2005): 
available at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/econ_henry_g8debtrelief.shtml (accessed 
November 8, 2005).
107 Arslanalp and Blair Henry, “Research: G8 Debt Relief Plan May Not Help.”
108 Ibid.
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transparent governance criteria required for debt cancellation.”109 The Blair Plan for debt 
reduction eventually gave way to a much more generous package presented in 
Gleneagles, Scotland at the 2005 G8 summit.
Under the Gleneagles plan Ghana, along with 17 other Latin American and 
African states, would receive 100 percent cancellation of debt, with a combined reduction 
in annual debt burden of $1.5 billion.110 The summit also resulted in a pledge from the 
G8 countries to double the aid received by Africa to $50 billion by 2010. While this 
agreement still “falls short of the goal of committing rich nations to donate .7 percent of 
GDP by 2015,” it is still a promising sign for the future of Africa.111 Whether this latest 
move to cancel much of Africa’s debt has the intended positive effects is yet to be seen. 
Either way it has generated considerable hope as Africa moves forward.
Redesigning Aid Programs
World Bank documents have suggested that “in the interest of preserving social 
peace and reducing tensions in times of crisis, it is crucial for governments to create jobs 
when the private sector cannot, maintain expenditures on education and health, and 
targeted expenditures to protect the most vulnerable.”112 While this is a noble goal, under 
structural adjustment many countries have struggled to reach it. Policymakers have also 
recommended that countries should weigh the benefits of these programs against the 
costs, but as noted above, many implemented the programs simply to continue the flow of 
aid, without evaluating their potential benefits and costs.113 Looking at these goals from
109 ibid.
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early in the structural adjustment period, it would be difficult for the World Bank to call 
these programs a success.
Evidence exists that when the people are made aware of a program and its 
potential effects, the program has a higher chance of success.114 When the people are 
prepared to deal with the consequences of a program, but can see improvements 
gradually occurring, it is likely that they will have less of a problem with it. The IMF 
intervention in Korea was a good example of this, showing that if the people are aware of 
and support a program it has a higher chance of success.115 The World Bank 
recommends that “all social and political groups must understand the issues at stake and 
accept that they are important.”116 When asked, “Have you heard about the Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP)?” nearly 60 percent of Ghanaians responded that they had not. 
This low level of awareness of the program suggests that the Ghanaian government is not 
working to mobilize support for the program, or even to increase awareness of it. The 
best way to build ownership for the program is to begin building support during the 
design stages, an important goal for any future economic development programs.117
Building support for economic programs can also be achieved by showing 
citizens that they will benefit directly from the program. Using the strategies employed 
by an alternative international aid organization could help the IFIs do just that.
Originally formed in Bangladesh in 1983, the Grameen Bank created a system of small 
scale lending that came to be known as microcredit. Unlike the SAPs, the Grameen Bank 
works to provide direct benefits for the citizens of developing countries by lending
114 Hayo and Shin, “Popular Reaction to the Intervention by the IMF in the Korean Economic Crisis,” 99.
115 Ibid.
116 Mills, “Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 21.
117 Ibid, 23.
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directly to them encouraging entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency.118 The Grameen 
Bank also lends almost exclusively to women, combating longstanding gender 
inequalities in many developing countries. Women repay loans with a higher frequency 
than men and are less likely to spend the money on themselves.119 The Grameen Bank 
also finds a significant positive effect on the schooling and nutrition of children when the
190loans are distributed to women.
The Grameen Bank shows an important strategy that has largely been ignored by 
the IFIs. If the IMF and World Bank allocated a small percentage of their economic aid 
packages to microcredit in developing countries, it would allow them to overcome some 
of the issues that have been most controversial under SAP. While the SAPs are criticized 
for reducing access to health care and education, the presence of the Grameen Bank has 
been shown to have a positive effect on these sectors.121 The Bank encourages healthy 
and responsible living on the part of its members, having them recite a list of 16 
resolutions at each weekly meeting.122 While they are not enforced, these resolutions
199encourage the women to practice proper hygiene and learn proper social dictums.
118 Mohammed Yunus, “The Grameen Bank,” Scientific American (Nov. 1999): 114.
119 Ibid., 117.
120 Ibid.
121 Konadu-Agyemang, The Best o f Times and the Worst o f Times,” 476; Patrick Develtere and An 
Huybrechts, “The Impact o f Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh,” Alternatives: Global, Local, and 
Political (April-June 2005): 178.
122 jg Decisions o f the Grameen Bank,” Grameen -  Banking for the Poor, accessed at 
http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/thel6.html (accessed February 6, 2006). A full list o f the resolutions 
can be found in the Appendix.
123 Yunus, “The Grameen Bank,” 115.
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CONCLUSIONS
The main thesis of this paper has been that the peoples’ opinion of structural 
adjustment programs is driven by their perceptions of equality and by the tangible 
benefits provided. Analysis of the Affobarometer survey in Ghana showed that these 
relationships did in fact exist and that many citizens remain dissatisfied with aid 
programs now over 20 years old. Ghanaians often fail to see tangible benefits from the 
ERP, while they do find increasing inequality under the program. If the economic 
struggles under ERP continue, it could create instability in this young democratic state.
The ERP has not worked as well as hoped, but positive signs for the future do 
exist. The government returned to democracy in 1992 and has seen no new coup 
attempts since. The ERP has simplified monetary exchange and allowed it to occur 
legally, instead of in the black market.124 By moving such transactions into legal 
markets, the economy gains legitimacy. Tourism has been a growth sector for Ghana’s 
economy, one area that has benefited from political stability, improved infrastructure, and 
currency devaluation.125 With the recent decision to cancel Ghana’s debt, more hope for 
future economic development is warranted, provided that this money is put to work in the 
economy, rather than officials’ pockets.
The dissatisfaction that many citizens feel with SAPs can be explained at least in 
part by the lack of success that many programs have had in reducing the debt a country 
faces, or in encouraging economic development. When citizens do not see their own 
situation improve over long periods of time, they are unlikely to be satisfied with 
international aid that dulls future economic prospects by increasing debt. The Grameen
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Bank seeks to improve the lives of citizens by working directly with them to achieve 
financial security. The Grameen is also working to reverse longstanding gender 
inequalities that exist in many developing countries. By making a difference in their 
lives, this organization is much more likely to be seen in a positive light by the poor.
If future conditional loans are to be more widely accepted, the IFIs need to work 
more closely with policymakers in the recipient country to build support for reform 
before it starts. When they need not worry about the response of the people it is much 
easier to implement a potentially unpopular program. For democratic states ensuring the 
acceptance of overarching economic programs is difficult, but attainable. If they can 
continue to provide tangible benefits to the people, replace the jobs lost through 
retrenchment of the public sector, and work to reduce inequality, the programs are much 
more likely to be accepted.
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APPENDIX -  Grameen Bank Resolutions
These 16 resolutions are recited at weekly meetings of Grameen Bank members.
Although they are not enforced, the presence of the Grameen has produced positive 
changes in the direction of many of these resolutions in the villages where it works.
o  We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank -  
Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard work -  in all walks of our lives, 
o  Prosperity we shall bring to our families.
o  We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and work 
towards constructing new houses at the earliest, 
o  We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them and 
sell the surplus.
o  During the planting seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible, 
o  We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our 
expenditures. We shall look after our health, 
o  We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their 
education.
o  We shall always keep our children and the environment clean, 
o  We shall build and use pit-latrines.
o  We shall drink water from tubewells. If it is not available, we shall boil water 
or use alum.
o  We shall not take any dowry at our sons’ weddings, neither shall we give any 
dowry at our daughters wedding. We shall keep our center free from the curse 
of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage, 
o  We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone, neither shall we allow anyone to 
do so.
o  We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher incomes, 
o  We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in difficulty, we 
shall all help him or her. 
o  If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any center, we shall all go 
there and help restore discipline, 
o  We shall take part in all social activities collectively.
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